// HACKER NEWS — CYBERSECURITY
Notes on gotchas while migrating 35kb preprompts from Opus to self-hosted Ollama
Maybe you’re a Claude code/codex user diligently avoiding uploading personal data to LLM providers. Is it possible that the most valuable information isn’t your data- but the metadata about your sessions? The intuitions you apply in coming up with ways to coax the ai into solving problems might actually be special. It’s statistically improbable, but Claude might not be gaslighting you. It may be that you’ve actually got a real insight! Your agent sessions are transcripts of the hardest problems you work on. What would it cost you if someone had copies of them?
Last week there was public drama that shines a light on the risk that inference providers are training on user activity with the intent of delivering new discoveries. The mathematicians affected have published concerns about the ethics of frontier providers. If you missed it: https://www.theverge.com/ai-artificial-intelligence/991710/openai-navier-stokes-solution
It’s become evident that the frontier providers are not only untrustworthy- but actively devious. If you want to protect your ideas, you cannot run inference on someone else’s hardware. It appears to be the case that everything you do with a frontier provider will get stolen. When a frontier provider talked through the navier-stokes equation situation with their lawyers, the best defensive strategy they came up with is “Cannot rule it out.” We can’t audit their retention or their training pipeline. Apparently neither can they.
These people should not be considered partners. They are pirates. If privacy matters, the only solution that enables verifiable protections is to operate your own hardware.
I am bewildered by OpenAI and Anthropic’s grandstanding on cybersecurity. They marvel at what they have wrought: AI beat their non-existent security controls. We are all in great ‘danger.’ Meanwhile, their llm “researchers” are running unsandboxed fleets of agents that appear to “spontaneously collaborate.” Somebody fetch me my fainting couch.
Frontier providers can afford advising from experienced security people. They almost certainly are paying some of them for perspective and leaving real cybersecurity guidance out of their public statements. All of this pearl clutching must be meant to solve a different problem than security.
The strongest & most accurate claim defenders can make about security is that we’ve found ways to make it “Pretty Hard” for attackers. This seems to result only when firms pay top dollar for the best talent in both exploit mitigation and exploit development. There’s rowdy but friendly competition between the defense and exploitation teams, and eventually you get controls that make successful attacks so expensive that they’re not worth doing. This is for the top tier companies in the country- although Microsoft seems like they’ve forgotten some lessons.The lion’s share of pentesting done for most enterprises is performed by security generalists. A very small subset are deep domain subject matter experts. Usually you get “good enough” security from that support. This isn’t the glamorous or mythical practice of cybersecurity you see in movies or tv. It’s looking for the known classes of predictable mistakes. The firms that make the big/smart investments with dedicated teams of experts discover and correct many new classes of mistakes before hackers do.
Everyone who begins learning exploitation hits a phase of exploitability grief about 3 month into dedicated, practiced study. They hack something they didn’t think they had the skill to break into and it terrifies them. They’re smart enough to know that, relatively speaking, they are an idiot, and if an idiot can do this then nothing is safe. That feeling is correct. It is also not a research finding. Some call this “imposter syndrome.” I disagree- that feeling is your first experience developing competence. Competence is knowing enough about a technical domain that you can distinguish what you know well from what you need to lea